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BACKGROUND PAPER OCTOBER 1988

PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEMAKING IN CYPRUS

by Robert Mitchell

> ". . . it is expedient that the Houses of Parliament do approve the participation of Canadian forces in the United Nations international force in Cyprus, and that this house do approve the same."
>
> *Hansard*, 13 March 1964

INTRODUCTION

There was general agreement in the debate leading to authorization of Canadian participation in the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) that the Force would be required to remain longer than the initial three-month mandate. But it was not expected that, a quarter of a century later, the Force would remain in existence and the conflict in Cyprus appear no nearer solution. Canada continues to contribute troops to UNFICYP; is a member of the Commonwealth, like Cyprus; and is also a NATO member, along with both Greece and Turkey. There is therefore a strong Canadian interest in the promotion of an equitable and enduring solution to the Cyprus conflict.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Cyprus, with an area of 9,530 square kilometres, is the third largest island in the Mediterranean. It lies 75 kilometres from the coast of Turkey and 100 kilometres from Syria. As a result of its central location, Cyprus was pillaged, conquered, oppressed or colonized by a succession of empires which were, in their turn, dominant in the region. Phoenicians, Assyrians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Crusaders, Venetians, Genoese and Ottoman Turks all left their mark on Cyprus. Nevertheless, the primary cultural influence remained the Greek-based civilization which had succeeded the Minoans on the island from 1500 BC. The Cypriot community today is roughly 80 percent of Greek heritage, and 18 percent of Turkish heritage, the remainder being Maronites, Armenians or Latins.

The Congress of Berlin in 1878 transfered Cyprus to British administration, under nominal Turkish sovereignty. Britain annexed Cyprus during World War I and formally established the island as a Crown Colony in 1925. However, the majority of the population, led by the independent Cypriot Church, favoured the inclusion of Cyprus in a Greek state.

This sentiment for *enosis* — the unification of Cyprus with Greece — had deep roots. In spite of foreign occupation, the essential hellenic cultural orientation of Cyprus had been maintained. The four centuries of Turkish rule resulted in the creation of a Turkish minority community distributed throughout the island. Even then, largely through Turkish governing processes, the Greek Cypriot Church was able to maintain its position of communal and cultural leadership.

Pro-*enosis* sentiment was evident from the earliest days of British occupation. Successive colonial administrators found it increasingly difficult to reconcile Britain's strategic interests in the Mediterranean, the geographic position of Cyprus, the interests of the Turkish community and the *enosis* sentiments of the Greek Cypriots. British ambivalence towards retention of Cyprus and the inability to reconcile the conflicting communal interests frustrated moves towards responsible government, with the result that Cyprus was ruled by Governor's decrees from 1931 until independence in 1960. Major riots occurred in 1931 in support of the demand for *enosis*. In 1951, in a church-conducted referendum, the Greek Cypriot community overwhelmingly endorsed the simple statement demanding *enosis*.

APPROACH TO CONFLICT

The EOKA (Ethnike Organosis Kypriotikes Apeleutheroseos) terrorist action began with a bombing campaign in April 1955. Its objectives were to end colonial status and achieve *enosis* with Greece. The British military response was combined with attempts to achieve a consensus with Turkey and Greece on the political future of Cyprus. Faced with a protracted guerrilla war against EOKA, Britain concluded that its interests could best be served by retaining only portions of the island as bases. A compromise was therefore sought to satisfy both the *enosis* sentiments favoured by the majority of Greek Cypriots and the minority interests of the Turkish Cypriot community.

Turkey had not been actively involved in the affairs of Cyprus since its annexation by Britain during World War I. The agitation for *enosis* caused both Turkish and Turkish Cypriot leaders to re-examine their support for the *status quo*. In particular the prospect of their status as a minority within a larger Greek state was unacceptable. There were also strategic concerns about the extension of Greek territory to the southern flank of Turkey. A solution substantially agreeable to Britain, Greece and Turkey was developed at meetings in Zurich and London in February 1959. The role of the leader of the Greek Cypriot community, Archbishop Makarios, and the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, Fazil Kutchuk, was limited largely to signing the already approved documents.

Under the agreements, a Republic of Cyprus was to be created which would reject both partition (*taxim*) and *enosis*. Stringent safeguards for the Turkish Cypriot community were incorporated in government functions. This included the civil service (70 percent Greek/30 percent Turkish Cypriot), a 2000-man army (60 percent Greek/40 percent Turkish Cypriot), the House of Representatives (35 Greek/ 15 Turkish Cypriot), the Cabinet (7 Greek/3 Turkish Cypriot). The justices of the Constitutional High Court and the High Court of Justice were similarly apportioned. The President was to be a Greek Cypriot and the Vice-President a Turkish Cypriot both with veto powers. For its military requirements, Britain retained 240 square kilometres in two sovereign bases. Greece was permitted to garrison 950 soldiers on the island and Turkey 650. These arrangements were formalized in four documents signed in Nicosia on 16 August 1960: the Treaty of Establishment and the Treaty of Guarantee (signed by Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and Britain), the Treaty of Alliance (signed by Cyprus, Greece and Turkey) and the Constitution.

Thus the Republic of Cyprus which came into existence on 16 August 1960 had several limitations imposed on its sovereignty. Nevertheless, the solution was reasonably satisfactory for the guaranteeing powers—Britain, Greece and Turkey. It seemed to resolve the regional issues with provisions to protect all communities on Cyprus. The limitations on Cypriot sovereignty were regarded by the guaranteeing powers as minor inconveniences to be accepted for the common good. Unfortunately, the constitutional arrangements could not be extended from theory to practice. The constitutional provisions proved less than practical and tended to further the estrangement of the two communities. Many Greek Cypriots resented the preclusion and future consideration of the option of *enosis* by what they regarded as undemocratic constitutional provisions. Because the constitution also precluded *taxim*, many Turkish Cypriots retained a general feeling of insecurity if not distrust of the intentions of the majority Greek Cypriot population. The resulting political estrangement led to a series of constitutional crises which, by the end of 1963, spilled over into intercommunal fighting which, in turn, paralyzed the government.

On 30 November 1963, the President, Archbishop Makarios, proposed constitutional amendments which would establish unified municipal administrations and eliminate the bi-communal provisions of the constitution. President Makarios stressed that his aim was to draw the two communities together by eliminating the provisions which split governmental functions on ethnic grounds, and by removing the veto provisions which had frustrated the process of government. Mutual suspicions had increased to the level that both communities were creating or expanding clandestine paramilitary forces. The Turkish Cypriot community did not accept the proposals which would have had the effect of reducing its role in government from a protected community to that of a minority. Serious disturbances broke out between the two communities. A violent confrontation in the northern suburbs of Nicosia on 21 December 1963 led to the deployment of the Turkish national contingent to that area on 24 December. Turkish aircraft overflew the island and military and naval concentrations were reported off the south coast of Turkey.

THE FORMATION OF UNFICYP

The governments of Britain, Greece and Turkey offered their good offices to restore peace and order. On 24 December, they proposed a joint peacekeeping force made up of troops already stationed on the island. The offer was accepted by the Cyprus government. By the end of December a truce had been arranged between the communal factions in the Nicosia area and a cease-fire line, "the green line," had been established to separate the communal areas by a neutral zone patrolled mainly by the British contingent. A conference of representatives of Britain, Greece and Turkey and the two communities of Cyprus was arranged for London in January 1964.

The London Conference took place against a background of increased intercommunal fighting and separation. The government of Cyprus rejected proposals to strengthen the existing peacekeeping force based on the contingents of the three guaranteeing powers or possibly other NATO nations, in favour of a force under United

Nations auspices. The continued deterioration of the local situation and the growing possibility of military intervention in Cyprus by Greece or Turkey provided strong incentives for establishing a United Nations peacekeeping force.

On 4 March 1964 the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 186 recommending the creation of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for the preservation of international peace and security. The Force was to prevent a recurrence of fighting and contribute to the maintenance of law and order and the restoration of normal conditions. The government of Cyprus agreed to the formation of the Force which was to be present for a period of three months. In spite of the Secretary-General's appeals to all parties for restraint and a de-escalation of violence, the situation in Cyprus continued to deteriorate and the danger of unilateral external intervention increased.

The Canadian response at this time was crucial to the rapid establishment of the Force. Parliament gave its approval for a Canadian contingent and an advance party of the 1,100-man Canadian contingent arrived in Cyprus on 15 March. The rapid arrival of the Canadian contingent combined with the British contingent already in place enabled UNFICYP to be operationally established by 27 March. This prompt action diminished the justification for unilateral action by Turkey. By the end of April, other national contingents and support organizations were on the island. By August 1964, UNFICYP force levels stabilized at just over 6,200 with military contingents from Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Also part of the force were civilian police contingents from Australia, Austria, Denmark, New Zealand and Sweden.

The peacekeeping operation was to be funded in a manner to be agreed upon by the troop-contributing nations, and the government of Cyprus and the Secretary-General were authorized to accept voluntary contributions for the maintenance of the Force, the requirement for which it was originally thought would be limited to a few months. The voluntary funding arrangement has proven to be an inequitable and inefficient means of financing a peacekeeping operation. Unlike other operations, troop-contributing nations had to provide the costs of the troops. Compensation for additional expenses of contingents and the central operating costs of UNFICYP could only keep balance with the inflow of voluntary contributions. From the beginning the Force was in a deficit position as there was a general reluctance to support voluntary contributions. The largest contributions to UNFICYP have been from NATO countries.

Acceptance of the voluntary funding formula was one of the compromises required to establish the Force. Within the Security Council, there was general agreement that the threat of communal violence leading to civil war, and possibly war between Greece and Turkey, required intervention. There were different views in the Security Council on the nature of the problem: one view was that it was an issue of self-determination to be resolved by the Cypriots; another that the cause was unequal treaties forced upon the Republic of Cyprus which should be modified; and a third that the treaties formed part of a regional context from which the existence of Cyprus could not be separated. Of the permanent members, both the USSR and France opposed any arrangement which would give extensive freedom of action to either the mediator or the force commander, such as extended mandates or long-term financial arrangements.

One of the continuing dilemmas of UNFICYP remains how to balance an effective peacekeeping operation with the requirement to maintain the momentum in the search for an underlying political solution. Secure financing and a wide-ranging mandate with extensive delegated powers enhances the effectiveness of the peacekeeping function. On the other hand such longer-term perspectives may detract from the political will to compromise and achieve a political solution which is accepted as the objective of the peacemaking operation. Canada has argued consistently for a more equitable method of financing UNFICYP and queried how much longer the operation should be continued in the absence of any substantive progress towards a political settlement.

UNFICYP OPERATIONS 1964-1974

The key principle of UNFICYP operations was complete impartiality towards both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. The United Nations Force could resort to arms only in self-defence and then only under the principle of minimum force.

The perception of the UNFICYP's mandate differed according to communal viewpoints. Greek Cypriots saw UNFICYP as a means of suppressing the Turkish rebellion and extending the authority of the central government. In the view of the Turkish Cypriot community, UNFICYP should restore and protect their separate community status as guaranteed under the 1960 Constitution.



With UNFICYP's presence deterring major military operations, an uneasy truce prevailed between the communities. The initial three-month duration was extended, eventually by six-month periods. In the search for security and protection from communal violence, populations tended to congregate into enclaves. As the minority community, Turkish enclaves tended to be the norm. These varied in size from the major enclave, encompassing the area from the Kyrenia Pass to northern Nicosia, to a few houses in smaller villages. As communal fighting escalated, enclaves increasingly were protected by defensive fortifications. These were in turn paralleled by encircling fortifications which had the effect of besieging and further isolating enclaves. UNFICYP made little progress in the actual dismantling of these fortifications although in some areas local forces were persuaded to leave them unoccupied.

Nevertheless, from 1964 to 1967, UNFICYP was able to facilitate a restoration of government services and utilities and a degree of normalization of economic life. This included escorts for movements of food, merchandise and civilian traffic, harvesting and land maintenance arrangements, water and electrical utility service and basic government services such as social security and postal service. In the absence of a political settlement, these achievements generally had to be negotiated on an *ad hoc* basis with the *de facto* local authority.

From 1964 to 1974, UNFICYP was not capable of completely preventing crisis situations from arising, or of taking action to disarm military forces on the island. UNFICYP was, however, capable of limiting the consequence of crisis. Thus the likelihood of major Turkish intervention or the overrunning of isolated Turkish enclaves by the Greek Cypriot forces was reduced. This stabilizing presence and a return to a degree of normalcy resulted in the military strength of UNFICYP being reduced to 2,200 by 1974.

COUP AND INTERVENTION

By the spring of 1974, it appeared that a political settlement in Cyprus might be possible. The intercommunal talks, progressing slowly since 1968, had produced a package deal which balanced a degree of Turkish community autonomy with modifications to some of the separate status provisions of the 1960 constitution. Acceptance of these provisions would confirm an independent Cyprus without *enosis* with Greece. External factors and pro-*enosis* elements were to ensure that this proposed settlement package could not be implemented.

Clandestine pro-*enosis* activities increased in the summer of 1972. At the same time, the military leaders in Greece were considering direct intervention in Cyprus as a dramatic event to restore public support. The Cypriot National Guard under its Greek officers staged a coup on 15 July 1974 but failed to kill President Makarios who escaped from the island to rally international support.

On 20 July, Turkey intervened militarily in Cyprus, claiming the unilateral rights of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee as justification. The regime established by the coup collapsed and the government of Cyprus resumed authority under the Speaker of the House, Glafcos Clerides. At the same time, the military dictatorship in Athens also collapsed. Meanwhile Turkish forces quickly occupied Kyrenia and moved south to link up with the Turkish Cypriot enclave in Nicosia.

UNFICYP was in a difficult position. Its structure, strength and equipment were designed to control intercommunal violence, rather than to intervene in large-scale military operations. From 20 to 25 July, UNFICYP used its freedom of movement to promote the safety of the civilian population. This involved protection of isolated communities and the evacuation of foreign missions from Nicosia to the British Sovereign Base at Dhekelia. Nicosia Airport, which had been the scene of heavy fighting, was occupied and designated a United Nations Protected Area.

The Security Council authorized the Force to carry out duties relating to the maintenance of the cease-fire which had gradually been enforced by 24 July. UNFICYP's strength was increased to just over 4,440 by 14 August. Meanwhile from 25 to 30 July, the Foreign Ministers of Britain, Greece and Turkey, meeting in Geneva, reached agreement to establish a security zone around the bridgehead to reduce confrontation.

Negotiations to define the security zone and other elements of the cease-fire broke down on 14 August and the Turkish army undertook military operations to expand its bridgehead. United Nations personnel again attempted to preserve the cease-fire and protect civilian populations. Partial cease-fires were established in Nicosia on 15 August and a general cease-fire achieved on 16 August 1974. By this time the Turkish army controlled the northern 40 percent of Cyprus.

THE SEARCH FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION 1974-86

The historical and political problems which had frustrated an effective constitutional arrangement from 1960 to 1974 were now complicated by the factors of armed occupation, refugees, property loss, missing persons and *de facto* partition. The trauma of the events of 1974, did however force a degree of communal cooperation to resolve the most pressing humanitarian concerns. Informal meetings in Cyprus led to a series of Intercommunal Talks in Vienna and New York in 1975 and 1976.

One of the chief results was the agreement to effect a transfer of populations to permit a consolidation of communities. It was variously seen as a temporary measure to reduce potential conflict and to allow a cooling off period. Whatever the original intent, the communal transfers, combined with the refugee dislocations of 1974, created a situation in Cyprus unique since the arrival of the Turks in 1571. The island was now effectively



partitioned into two distinct ethnic zones. The focus of political discussion henceforth would not be on separate municipalities but federalism or bi-communalism at a national level.

The period from 1976 to 1986 saw a succession of low-level and high-level meetings, intercommunal talks, and talks initiated by the good offices of the Secretary-General. Considerable ingenuity was devoted to finding territorial, constitutional and financial inducements to a settlement, but in the end all efforts to achieve a political solution to the Cyprus problem failed. Disenchantment with the United Nations both as peacekeeper and peacemaker was misplaced, for in the absence of the political will to accept a compromise solution there was little the UN could do.

This lack of political will was not surprising; numerous disincentives were now in place and the political risks of accepting a compromise solution were high. For the Turkish Cypriot community the primary disincentive was the progressive consolidation of a separate political regime culminating in the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus supported by a communally approved constitution and elections. For the Greek Cypriot community, a bi-communal Cyprus was acceptable only in the context of a solution which provided for the so-called "three freedoms"—freedom of settlement, freedom of property ownership and freedom of movement. To these factors must also be added those of the continued presence of Turkish military forces on the island, the question of immigrant settlers from Turkey and the ongoing reconstruction of the economy, exploitation of resources and development of infastructure on a dual rather than unitary basis.

Canadian involvement in the search for a political solution to the Cyprus question reached a peak in 1978 when Canada was also a member of the Security Council. In September 1978, the United States, with the active support of Canada and Great Britain, proposed the "ABC" plan as a catalyst for reviving intercommunal talks. The plan combined proposals from the three elements discussed earlier—constitution, territory and development aid. The plan failed to achieve the support of the two communities. One reason was the strong identification of the United States with the plan which implied a degree of external interference and financial coercion. Another reason was perhaps that a flexible, pragmatic approach to federal arrangements was not applicable in a situation requiring precise definition of powers in order to gain communal acceptance.

Parallel with the "ABC" Cyprus initiative, Canada also

participated in the 1978 United Nations review of the question of peacekeeping operations. The Canadian position stressed that peacekeeping was an essential function of the United Nations but was not in itself a substitute for the peaceful settlement of disputes; that peacekeeping costs should be borne by all United Nations members; and that practical measures as well as general guidelines were required to ensure the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. The passing of the resolution by the General Assembly, however, had little effect on the financial and other arrangements for UNFICYP, nor on the dispute itself.

A detached observer cannot but lament the missed opportunities for cooperation and reconciliation that have occurred despite protracted discussions. On the one hand, the Turkish community has been unable to set aside past grievances, preferring instead the security offered by a geographically separate communal existence. On the other hand, the Greek Cypriot community has been unwilling to appreciate the Turkish Cypriot concerns raised by a solution based solely on self-determination. A solution incorporating the requirements for communal security with the communal mobility required to implement the "three freedoms" has remained elusive, and no one has been prepared to run the considerable risks of a partial solution which could lead to more comprehensive arrangements.

These generalizations do not give the full picture of the complex motivations involved, but they do indicate the underlying sentiments which frustrated practical arrangements to move towards a mutually acceptable solution. In the meantime the passage of time has granted the aura of an acceptable *status quo* to the division of the island.

UNFICYP TODAY
MANDATE, STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS

UNFICYP's mandate remains as established by the Security Council in March 1964, augmented by additional direction reflecting the changes necessitated by the Turkish intervention. Four major tasks are entailed by the mandate, namely: maintenance of the cease-fire, maintenance of the *status quo*, restoration of normal conditions, and humanitarian functions.

To carry out these tasks the current military strength of UNFICYP is established at 2,087 provided by contingents from eight nations. At present, contingent strengths are as follows: Austria (401); Canada (575); Denmark (341); Finland (10); Ireland (8); Sweden (11); and the United Kingdom (741). Australia and Sweden provide civilian police contingents of 20 and 15 respectively. Civilian political and administrative staff of 35 bring the force total to 2,157.

The Buffer Zone traverses some of the most productive agricultural land in Cyprus. UNFICYP has undertaken to return as much of the Buffer Zone as possible to productive use under the control of its rightful owners. As well, UNFICYP continues to promote the return to normal conditions through humanitarian operations including control of rabid animals, fire-fighting and mosquito eradication programmes. UNFICYP coordinates and supervises repair and maintenance of the portions of the water and electrical grids traversing the Buffer Zone. The Nicosia Master Plan involving the installation of modern sewage and water facilities to all communities of the municipality is also assisted by UNFICYP. There is only one major crossing point of the Buffer Zone which is used by UNFICYP to facilitate the movement of mail, medical supplies, visas and citizenship documentation, patient and community transfers.

The current manning of UNFICYP is adequate to permit effective maintenance of the cease-fire. The key to this success is the system of liaison maintained by UNFICYP with all levels of command for all forces along the Buffer Zone. Incidents can thus be resolved at the lowest possible level. The low number of cease-fire violations reflects the high degree of cooperation between UNFICYP and opposing forces.

The greatest danger to the maintenance of the cease-fire continues to be the proximity of opposing forces within Nicosia. The potential for a serious accidental or non-intentional violation remains high. Constant vigilance along with scrupulous and impartial enforcement of all agreements and understandings are required to contain tensions in Nicosia, where opposing forces are as close as five metres. The standard of patrolling and observation must remain high as a confidence-building measure to demonstrate that UNFICYP can maintain the *status quo*. Various proposals have been considered for the removal of military forces from the walled portion of the city of Nicosia as a measure of disengagement or "de-confrontation" in UNFICYP terminology. To date, these proposals have not been accepted.

The integrity of the Buffer Zone is regarded by UNFICYP as a key confidence-building measure between opposing forces. The Buffer Zone is not maintained to divide the two communities but as a practical and accepted cease-fire provision. Confrontation is lessened if UNFICYP can demonstrate that it can prevent penetration of the Buffer Zone, either accidental or intentional, from either side. With a total strength of under 2,200 personnel for the 180-kilometre-long Buffer Zone, UNFICYP could not carry out this task without the bi-lateral cooperation between the force and each of the opposing forces. United Nations civilian police detachments work with local police to prevent unauthorized civilian incursions.

THE CANADIAN BALANCE SHEET

It is not possible to measure the goodwill and positive influence which accrues from Canada's support of United Nations peacekeeping, but one can assume that Canada would not lightly surrender its peacekeeping reputation

solely for financial considerations. For senior commanders and officers, moreover, peacekeeping offers significant opportunities for professional development in the areas of resource allocation, training, international relations, mediation and negotiation. UNFICYP also provides leadership and training challenges to young soldiers beyond the scope offered in traditional military environments. The maturity, self-confidence, expanded horizons and leadership skills provided by a tour of duty with UNFICYP are not quantifiable but provide a continuing benefit to the Canadian military.

Nevertheless, after contributing troops to UNFICYP for twenty-four years of peacekeeping without substantive peacemaking, the question of how long Canada ought to remain is pertinent. The direct costs are straightforward. Twenty-seven Canadians have died from gunshot wounds, accident or sickness while serving with UNFICYP since 1964. During 1987, the Department of National Defence spent $8.4 million for the Canadian military contingent. The dollar value of the Canadian contribution is therefore significant, although it is small in relation to total DND expenditures. The incremental cost to Canada is low since the wages and associated costs of military personnel would continue whether they were assigned to UNFICYP or remained in Canada on alternate duties.

Canada continues to question how long the Parties to the dispute can expect the international community to pour money and resources into a situation which they themselves do not seem to be working energetically towards alleviating. At the same time, it is recognized that, until a political solution is found, no practical alternative to UNFICYP exists as a mechanism for preserving the *status quo* of relative peace. Canadian withdrawal from the Force for reasons of military effectiveness or cost alone is therefore unlikely.

FUTURE PROSPECTS

It seems likely that, for the foreseeable future, the mandate of UNFICYP will be renewed at six-month intervals. Although Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot administration keep the matter under review, they have agreed to the continued presence of UNFICYP under existing arrangements. Greece continues to accept the presence of UNFICYP. The greatest threat to the continued existence of UNFICYP remains the perilous state of finances. Direct United Nations costs for UNFICYP currently average $13 million for six months. Voluntary contributions generally amount to only $3 million. The UNFICYP deficit stood at $160 million at the end of November 1987. At the present time, there is no consensus in the Security Council to permit a change from voluntary to assessed funding for UNFICYP. Many nations, including the Soviet Union and France, while paying their obligatory United Nations assessment, have not made voluntary contributions to UNFICYP. Only one-quarter of the nations have made any kind of voluntary contribution.

The communal security situation which led to the creation of UNFICYP remains and must be resolved concurrent with any political settlement. A demilitarized Cyprus in which both communities feel secure will be as difficult to negotiate as the political issues. The presence of over 30,000 Turkish soldiers in Cyprus and an influx of a large number of settlers from Turkey are seen by Greek Cypriots as an alien occupying force and a presence which distorts the community balance on Cyprus. Against this potential Turkish military threat, the Greek Cypriot National Guard has received increased numbers of armoured vehicles, air defence and other weapons. The increased military capability of the National Guard is viewed by the Turkish Cypriot community as a threat, justifying the continued presence of Turkish forces. Considerable scope exists to implement a demilitarization regime as part of a comprehensive settlement. UNFICYP would be a logical agency to supervise the demilitarization and its associated verification provisions.

The opportunity for a bi-communal solution in Cyprus is likely to diminish as *de facto* division is perpetuated. Infrastructural, communal, educational, governmental and commercial activities are adjusting to the division. The international community has shown a tendency to accept the present dimensions of the Cyprus situation as a problem under control. If not entirely acceptable internationally, the *status quo* does not present itself as a priority issue for resolution. In this context, the continued existence of UNFICYP to contain and manage the situation could be viewed by interested parties as preferable to the uncertainties of political and military adjustments which would accompany a definitive resolution to the problem.

The peacemaking process has now been deadlocked for two years. Both sides accept the general principles worked out in the High Level Agreements of 1977 and 1979 but remain divided on the method of implementation. In spite of the lack of agreement on the 1985 and 1986 versions of the draft agreement, there are some signs for optimism. To highlight the importance placed upon the mission of good offices, the Secretary-General has appointed a permanent Special Representative in Cyprus. Oscar Camilion assumed his duties in the spring of 1988. The heads of government of Greece and Turkey, after a meeting in Switzerland in January 1988, agreed to measures to facilitate a greater *rapprochement*. Presidential elections held in Cyprus on 21 February resulted in the election of George Vassiliou who had indicated his willingness to reopen the process of negotiation. This change in leadership reflects a restructuring of political opinion which will also increase the opportunity for a settlement. The lack of concrete results after the third summit meeting of Greek and Turkish prime ministers in June 1988 indicated, however, that even in an atmosphere of goodwill and mutual understanding, the process of political reconciliation will be protracted.

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